Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

The State of Utah v. Benton Brian Keith : Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Joel M. Allred; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Keith, No. 12029 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5217

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREJ.(E .
OF THE ST ATE _Q
.

'

;

-

.

.'!,
t

THE STATE OF UTAll.·.

P""""l/ ""4
w.

VERNON B. B.OMNIY
Aittomey Geseral
236 Stare Capitol Bu.iJ.dktll
Salt Lake City, Utah 8'111.
AllON181 frw

. '

..- .

.·

¥: f,;r.

,.,.

.• -l

,_-_.,-,.·s.

,

1'

;.

-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE KJND OF CASE ------------------------------

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT --------------------------------------

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------

2

ARGUI\L:!NT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFIOENT TO SUSTAIN
TI E CONVICTION ------------------------------------------------------------ 6
A. The Testimony of The Prosecutrix Was So Unreliable, Contradictory and Inherently Improbable As To Be Unworthy of Belief -------------------------- 10
B. The Prosecutrix' Medical Background Made
Adequate Corroboration, Where Available,
Mandatory. The State Failed to Produce Adequate Corroboration For The Testimony of
The Prosecutrix ------------------------------------------------------------ 13
C. The State Failed to Prove Essential Elements
of Its Case ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
POINT II.
THE COURT PERMITTED THE INTRODUCTION OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS WHICH MISLED THE JURY AND PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT ------------------------------------------

19

POINT III.
THE TRANSLATION WAS INACCURATE, CONFUSED AND PREJUDIOAL TO THE DEFENDANT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24
POINT IV.
THAT THE ERRORS OF THE COURT WERE
CUMULATIVE AND WHEN VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH EACH OTHER RESULTED IN
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT ---------------------------- 27

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

APPENDIX ------------------------------------·----·--·---·----------------------------------- 31
ANNOTATIONS CITED
172 A.L.R. 91 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

CASES OTED
Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp.,
175 F.2d 77, 80 (2nd Cir.) ----------------------------------------------------

27

Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 ------------------------ 8, 17
Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc.,
17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 ____ ---------------------------------------

23

Gregory v. Chicago R.D. and P.R. Co.,
147 Iowa 715, 124 N.W. 797 ------------------------------------------------

26

Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.,
1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 ----------------------------------------------

26

Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital,
7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 ------------------------------------------------

23

Larson v. Evans, 12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088 --------------------

26

Morris v. State, (Utah) 131 P. 731 -------------------------------------- 16, 28
Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 154, 33 Ad. 998 --------------------- --------

20

Prokop v. Nebraska, 148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W. 2d 200 --------------

26

Rogers v. Rogers, 80 N.H. 96, 114 Ad. 270 ------------------------------

21

State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 P. 597 ------------------------------------

18

State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 -------------------------------- 23, 27
State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 ------------------------------------

18

State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9 --------------------------------

8

State v. Halford, 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819 --------------------------------

28

State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 P.2d 109 -----------··-----------

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174 ·-------------·--------- 17
State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173 ------------------------

22

State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818 --------------------------------

18

State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211 --------------------------------

6

State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973 --------------------------

27

State v. Neal, (Utah) 262 P.2d 756 ----------------------------------------------

15

State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174 -------------------- 23, 27
State v. Whittinghill, 109 Utah 48, 163 P.2d 342 ------------------ 22, 28
State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551 -----------------------·

6

ENCYCLOPEDIAS CITED
C.J.S. 869, note 21 ------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

TREATISES OTED
Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 264-266 (1898) ----

21

STATUTES OTED
76-53-15 (3) U.C.A. 1953 --------------------------------------·---·---·--------------- 16
76-1-20 U.C.A. 1953 ------------------------------------------·-----·--------------------- 18
76-1-22 U.C.A. 1953 --------------------------------------------------------------------

18

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BENTON BRIAN KEITH,

Case No.
12029

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter "defendant")
was accused of having committed the crime of rape in
San Juan County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was convicted on January 16, 1970,
of the rape of Larina Nakai Yazzie. The verdict was
filed with the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District on January 19, 1970, and judgment was entered by
the Court, the Honorable Edward Sheya presiding, ()n
February 10, 1970. The defendant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not less
1

than ten years.
appeals.

From this judgment, the defendant

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks the reversal of the judgment
below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 22, 1969, Larina Nakai Yazzie (hereinafter "prosecutrix") arrived in Monticello from Blanding at approximately 4:00 p.m. (R. 13). She was accompanied by Mrs. Scotty "Jean" Jones (R. 12). Both
of the women were widows (R. 12, 21). They arrived
in a pickup truck driven by one Sam Chee, Mrs. Jones
riding in the back of the pickup and the prosecutrix
riding in the front with Sam Chee and Mrs. Chee (R.
12). After visiting a medical clinic, the prosecutrix rejoined Jean Jones "by the tavern" (R. 13) and together
they later went "where the boys were" (R. 57), apparently the same tavern (R. 4, 73), where the prosecutrix
first saw the defendant, Benton Brian Keith.
Jean Jones, the prosecutrix' companion, testified that
she was with the prosecutrix during the interval between
her visit to the medical clinic and her meeting in the
tavern with Benton Keith (R. 56, 57). Mrs. Jones testified that during this interval the prosecutrix requested
that the two of them purchase beer from a local establishment (R. 56). The prosecutrix denied categorically
having had anything to drink during the evening and
2

early morning of September 22 and 23, 1969, the time
of the alleged offense (R. 5, 13, 15, 94). She also denied
having purchased beer with Jean Jones (R. 13).
The two women went to the tavern where Benton
Keith, a nephew of the prosecutrix, was drinking and
shooting pool (R. 73). They requested a ride home to
Blanding. The defendant attempted to make excuses
but, after repeated urgings, agreed to take Jean Jones,
Betty Jones Phillips, the daughter of Jean Jones, and
Larina Yazzie home (R. 73, 74).
The prosecutrix testified that the women, Benton
Keith and Al Bylilly, a brother-in-law of the defendant,
left Monticello at around 5:30 to 6:00 p.m.; that they
arrived in Blanding, after a stop at Devil's Canyon Campground, at approximately 7:00 p.m. and that they proceeded directly through Blanding to the city dump outside of the city, arriving there shortly after 7:00 p.m.
(R. 16). The prosecutrix lived in the city of Blanding
(R. 29). There is no indication in the record that she
requested to be taken home or to be let out in the city
before the parties proceeded on to the city dump.
Before leaving Monticello, and as their first official
act, the parties stopped at a liquor store (R. 57) to purchase wine (R. 58). The wine was purchased, at least
in part, with money obtained from the prosecutrix (R.
57). The prosecutrix claimed that the money was furnished to her nephew, the defendant, as consideration
for the ride and not for the purchase of wine (R. 14).
The defendant, who was driving, testified that there
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were two separate stops at the liquor store before the
return trip to Blanding, and that the prosecutrix furnished money for purchases on each occasion (R. 74, 76).
Both the defendant and Jean Jones testified that all of
the parties participated in drinking the wine purchased
in Monticello (R. 58, 75).
Charles Farnsworth, an officer of the Utah State
Fish and Game Department, called as a witness for the
State, observed the prosecutrix and the accused at the
Blanding city dump and testified that she appeared to
be intoxicated (R. 51).
When the parties arrived at the city dump, outside
of Blanding, Jean Jones, Betty Jones Phillips and Al
Bylilly left the car taking "one" bottle with them (R. 5).
They proceeded "north toward the mountain" (R. 16).
The prosecutrix chose to remain in the vehicle with the
defendant.
The prosecutrix then testified that Benton Keith
made improper advances and that she fled the car and
attempted to hide. She testified that he found her; that
she fought him with "all her strength" and that he
struck her in the face and body (R. 5, 6). She alleged
that she then became unconscious (First time). She awakened to discover that the defendant was having sexual
intercourse with her and then lost consciousness again
(Second time). She regained consciousness long enough
to see the defendant putting his trousers back on, was
again physically attacked, and again became unconscious
(R. 7) (Third time). She then awakened in the auto-
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mobile, without knowing how she got there, whereupon
she opened the door and ran and hid for a second time
(R. 8). She was again located by the defendant, who
kicked and choked her so that she lost consciousness
(Fourth time). Most propitiously, she awakened to find
the defendant engaged in a second act of intercourse,
whereupon she lost consciousness (Fifth time), regained
consciousness long enough to see the defendant putting
on his underclothes, then lost consciousness again (Sixth
time).
The prosecutrix stated that she then walked to her
home, approximately one mile away (R. 8), where she
found that the door was locked and that her sons
"wouldn't answer" (R. 9). She then went to the home of
a neighbor, Wesley Oshley, arriving at approximately
3:00 a.m. (R. 9). This was, roughly, eight hours after
she arrived at the city dump with Benton Keith, Jean
Jones, Betty Phillips and Al Bylilly, and approximately
nine hours after she first got in Benton Keith's automobile.
The prosecutrix did not attempt, when allegedly
raped, to solicit any assistance from the other occupants
of the vehicle who were in the immediate vicinity. She
stated that she did not call out for anyone (R. 18). Further,
when she allegedly ran from the vehicle, she did not proceed "north toward the mountain" as the others had done
but rather in another direction (R. 17).
Larina Yazzie remained at Wesley Oshley's home until approximately 5:00 a.m. (R. 9), when she returned
home and notified her son, Billy, a college student (R.
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94), what had happened (R. 9). At 7:50 a.m., five hours
after her arrival at Wesley Oshley's, the police were notified (R. 29). Dr. Lamar Gibbons, her personal physician,
arrived shortly thereafter (R. 31).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFIOENT TO SUSTAIN
THE CONVICTION.

This court has clearly indicated that in cases where
the State's evidence is so "inherently improbable" as to be
unworthy of belief the jury's verdict would not be permitted to stand. Where it appears, upon objective analysis, that reasonable minds could not believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, it is the
duty of the appellate court to reverse on appeal. State v.
Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211. In weighing its role,
the Court has appropriately noted that a determination
as to whether or not a jury could conclude that the evidence proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is inescapable. State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180
P.2d 551. The necessity for heavy reliance upon the testmony of the victim has, in rape cases, required "a very
strict rule of proof". State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364
P.2d 109.
In the instant case, the defendant stands convicted on
the scanty testimony of the prosecutrix. The physician
who examined Larina Yazzie, although finding some dam-
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age to her person, could state nothing more than his
opinion that she had had sexual intercourse within the
prior twenty-four hour period (R. 26). The doctor based
his opinion upon the microscopic examination of a swab
from the prosecutrix' vagina and on her assertion to him
that she had been raped (R. 26). The doctor concluded
that there were sperm in the vagina, which were not moving, and which could, theoretically, have been there for
as long as two days (R. 26). Apart from the self-serving
declarations of the prosecutrix to her own private physician (R. 23 ), there is little evidence which serves to corroborate her very sketchy and dislocated testimony of the
pertinent facts.
The defendant concedes that this court has not always required corroboration for the testimony of a rape
1 See the testimony of Evelyn Williams, the Prosecuttix' sister, who
testified that she had accompanied Larina Yazzie on September 20, 1969,
two days before the rape was alleged to have occurred, to look for Sam
Chee (R. 67). The testimony is as follows:
"Q. Ask her to tell the jury what transpired on that day? [September 20, 1969]
A. There was a telephone call on that day. It was from the cafe
and she said that she wasn't sick at the time but my sister has
her
spots all over her body from the blows that she got
son Billy and the problem was over Sam Chee. She said at
the time that she wanted to marry Sam Chee" (R. 67).

and, further,
"Q. What did Larina tell you about her family?
A. She said that the boy abused her and created problems for
her when she leaves to go somewhere.
Q. Does the boy use fists, or did Larina say anything about how
the boy abused her?
A. Yes.
.
.
. .
Q. What did she say?
A. She said that he hit me and also, hit me with his £1st and also
throws her around" (R. 69).
Note also that the prosecutrix informed her sc;in, Billy, of the events of
the evening upon returning home on the mornmg of September 23!
(R. 9) and that she was with him for several hours before the mvest1gating officer arrived (R. 30).
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v1ct1m as a mandatory prerequisite for conviction. The
court has, however, recognized the human frailties which
sometimes give rise to fraudulent charges with disastrous
2
consequences for an accused. A number of courts have
taken the position that while a conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the apparent
victim, that the court will closely scrutinize the testimony
to determine that it is not so "incredible" or "unsubstantial" as to require a reversal. State v. Goodale, 210 Mo.
275, 109 s.w. 9.
Where, as here, the testimony of the prosecutrix is on
its face improbable, contradictory, and unreasonable, adequate corroboration becomes a mandatory safeguard of
the rights of the accused. It is significant to note that the
State did not analyze or introduce in evidence the clothing worn by either the prosecutrix or by Benton Brian
Keith on the evening of September 22. Failure to present
the garments to show either spoiling or disarray, possible
seminal stains, or other incriminating evidence, permits
the inference that these conditions did not in fact exist.
Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536.
Further, the State pointedly failed to call Wesley
Oshley, Larina Yazzie's neighbor, as a witness, although
she was at his home from 3: 00 a.m. till 5: 00 a.m. on Sep2
See State v. Horne, supra at 112, where Justice Callister writing
the opinion for a unanimous court stated:
"However, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, there
must be considered the ease of assertion of the forcible accomplish·
ment of the sexual act, with impossibility of defense except by
direct denial, or of the proneness of the woman, when she finds
fact of her disgrace discovered or likely of discovery to min1m1ze her fault by asserting force or violence, . . ." (Emphasis sup·
plied)
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tember 23, 1969 (R. 9). Mr. Oshley could have testified as
to his observations of the prosecutrix' condition and as
to her contemporaneous representations to him, including
the presence or absence of complaints against Benton
Brian Keith. The State also failed to call Mrs. Tina
Willy, or Mr. Willy, who were present at the Yazzie
residence when the Chief of Police arrived (R. 30).
The State, relying on the Chief of Police and a medical doctor, chose to avoid, with a single unhelpful and
very limited exception, 3 the testimony of a single lay witness for confirmatory or corroborating proof of the alleged
victim's testimony. The list of exclusions included Wesley Oshley, Mr. and Mrs. Willy, Jean Jones, Betty Jones
Phillips and Al Bylilly, all of whom were more or less
involved in the events surrounding the evening and early
morning of September 22 and 23, 1969. Perhaps more
understandably, the omissions included the prosecutrix'
own adult children. 4
Assuming without conceding that an act of intercourse occurred at some indeterminate time prior to the
medical examination by Larina Yazzie's physician, there
is still no adequate legal corroboration for the testimony
of the prosecutrix that the crime of rape occurred. There
is evidence in the record that the prosecutrix, the 36-year
old mother of eight children, was in the company of Sam
Chee during the early afternoon of September 22, 1969,
3The testimony of Charles
(R. 48), which was, for all
intents and purposes, devoid of corroboratmg effect.
•who were presumably home and with their mother for approximately three hours before the Chief of Police, Gordon Hawkins, was
notified at 7:50 a.m. (R. 9, 29).
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less than 12 hours before the rape is supposed to have
occurred (R. 12, 13), and that she considered her relationship with Sam Chee as more than casual. 5

A. The Testimony of The Prosecutrix Was So Unreliable, Contradictory and Inherently Improbable As To
Be Unworthy of Belief.
Larina Yazzie was with the defendant, and with their
mutual friends, from approximately 6: 00 p.m. on the evening of September 22, 1969, until shortly before 3:00 a.m.
(R. 9) in the early morning of September 23, a period in
excess of eight hours. It is clear that the series of events
which preceded the Complaint were initiated by the prosecutrix and by her companion, Jean Jones, who located the
defendant in a local tavern and solicited a ride. The defendant was drinking before leaving the tavern; "everybody was feeling happy" and the first stop on the eventful
ride home was the local liquor store (R. 74). There is no
evidence that Larina Yazzie objected to the conduct of her
friends and no indication that she did anything but participate in the activities which started in Monticello and
ended at the city dump in Blanding.
5
Note the testimony of Jean Jones who accompanied Larina Yazzie
and Sam Chee to Monticello on September 22, 1969.

"Q. Did you have any conversation about Sam Chee?
A. She talked about him while I was with her.

Q. What did she say.
A. She said he was her -

Said he was her husband" (R. 60).

See also the testimony of Evelyn Williams, the prosecutrix' sister, who
testified that she was told by the prosecutrix that the prosecutrix intended
to marry Sam Chee, who was already married (R. 12), "for sure" (R. 68).
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There is not the slightest hint in the record that the
prosecutrix objected to the purchase or use of alcohol or
to the parking of the car at the San Juan County dump,
over a mile from her home. Further, when Jean Jones,
Betty Jones and Al Bylilly, who were drinking together,
left the car, she chose to remain in the car, alone, with the
accused. There is no indication that during the interim
period, between the time the other occupants left the car
and the offense allegedly occurred, that the prosecutrix re'·
quested to be taken to her home. During the time that
the prosecutrix was, according to her testimony, being
forcibly raped by the defendant on two separate occasions,
there was no outcry (R. 18) and no other attempt to alarm
or notify the other occupants of the vehicle who were presumably located nearby and within easy shouting distance. The prosecutrix testified that while her companions
went one direction toward the mountain, she went the
other when she "ran" from the car (R. 17). None of the
occupants of the Keith vehicle were called by the State
which chose to rely on Larina Yazzie's testimony exclusively.
While it is the responsibility of this court to view the
evidence in a light favorable to the prosecutrix, there are
several compelling examples of its unreliability. One
concerned the issue of her drinking. The prosecutrix repeatedly denied having had anything to drink on the evening in question (R. 5, 13, 15, 94).
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Jean Jones, Larina Yazzie's companion, who testified at the request of the defendant, stated that she and
Larina went to the store where, at Larina's request, they
purchased beer in "long" cans (R. 56). They then proceeded to go behind the store and drink the beer, having
at least three apiece (R. 56). This occurred prior to the
time they met Benton Keith at the tavern which was before 6:00 p.m. Mrs. Jones confirmed the testimony of the
defendant that all of the people in the car were drinking
and that the prosecutrix' money was used to make the
purchase (R. 57).
It is scarcely possible that the prosecutrix could,

under the circumstances, have entertained herself during
the lengthy trip to Blanding and over an eight-hour period
without having personally imbibed. In this regard, it is
worth noting that she did not call the investigating officer
for approximately five hours after her arrival at the home
of Wesley Oshley (R. 9, 29). The failure to immediately
report the incident was not explained. It is probable, considering the testimony of Jean Jones, Charles Farnsworth
and the defendant, that the prosecutrix required some time
to eliminate the evidence of her own intoxication. The
State's failure to call Wesley Oshley, or Mr. and Mrs.
Willy, as witnesses, should permit the inference that their
testimony would have been harmful to the State's case.
They were friends of the prosecutrix to whom the State
had superior access. No tests to determine whether or not
the prosecutrix had been drinking were applied. Clearly,
it would have been as easy for the doctor to take a blood
6
Who was close enough to the prosecutrix
tongue as "daughter" (R. 95).
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to

refer to her in the tribal

sample, in an effort to affirm or contradict the prosecutrix' testimony on this point, as to take a vaginal swab.
The prosecutrix testified that upon her arrival home
she could not get her children to open the door and let
her in (R. 9). Her statement that "the boys wouldn't
answer" (R. 9) (Emphasis supplied) was compatible with
the testimony of Jean Jones, who stated that the prosecutrix told her that she was drinking because her children
had scolded her (R. 59). Evelyn Williams stated that the
source of the disagreement with the children was Sam
Chee (R. 67).
The prosecutrix seemed to concede that her case rose
or fell on the issue of her drinking when she categorically
stated that,
"I did not drink any wine, and if I had drank that
much wine I wouldn't have known what went on
and I wouldn't have filed this complaint" (R. 15,
16) (Emphasis supplied).
B. The Prosecutrix' Medical Background Made Adequate Corroboration, Where Available, Mandatory. The
State Failed to Produce Adequate Corroboration For the
Testimony of The Prosecutrix.
The State called Dr. Lamar J. Gibbons, who had
known and treated the prosecutrix since March of 1966,
as a medical witness. The doctor, based upon his past observations of Larina Yazzie, indicated that she was, under
conditions of emotional stress, inclined to enter what he
referred to as "the fugal state" (R. 25 ). The fugal state
13

was described as being a semiconscious or stuporous condition (R. 28) characterized by a loss of apparent consciousness and physical movement, without an actual
blacking out (R. 25, 28). The doctor suggested that "financial problems" and "illness" were typical of the kinds
of stressful situations which could induce an abnormal
reaction in the prosecutrix. The death of her husband
caused such a condition, and "fights" in the family were
capable of doing so (R. 27). While in such a condition,
the doctor conceded that the prosecutrix was capable of
hallucinations, although he had not observed her hallucinate (R. 28). Although the doctor, when interrupted by
the prosecutor in his analysis of the effects of such a condition (R. 25 ), was quick to affirm that in his opinion the
prosecutrix was not in such a state of mind at the time of
his examination, it must be remembered that the examination took place more than five hours after the alleged
incident.
There is substantial indication in the testimony of
the prosecutrix that she was in precisely such a disordered state of mind when the events which she purports to
remember supposedly took place. (See Statement of Facts,
p. 4, 5, this Brief, also R. 7).
In describing the conduct of the prosecutrix when in
such a condition, the doctor indicated that she was basically in a state of amnesia as "to everything going on" (R.
28). He further indicated that Larina Yazzie had a tendency, when under emotional stress, to mentally move "to
another world". In such instances, he stressed, 0 Reality

14

just ceases for her" (R. 25). (Emphasis supplied) The
doctor also conceded that the occurrence of such stress
was usually "magnified by her [i.e. the prosecutrix] to be
something more serious usually than it is" (R. 27).
The State's medical witness then concluded that the
basic cause of such a condition was a form of hysteria peculiar to people who were not highly sophisticated in responding to stressful situations (R. 26).
The defendant does not accede to the view that because of such irregularities, the prosecutrix was incapable
of making complaint against one by whom she was abused. It must nonetheless be stressed that, given such a
history, it was incumbent upon the State to produce the
best available evidence to substantiate and corroborate
the generally suspect testimony of the prosecutrix. To
fail to call any occupant of the defendant's vehicle,
to fail to call any of the lay persons who first observed the
prosecutrix and heard her recital of the facts and to rely
upon her solely and exclusively for the facts surrounding
the incident itself, was to cynically deny the defendant the
basic elements of due process of law, including the full
and fair presentation of the case to a jury.7 It does not
suffice to say that the defendant had the opportunity to
call such witnesses and failed to do so, because it is the
State's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
and, specifically, in a rape situation, where such proof is
available, to provide adequate corroboration for the testimony of the accusing witness. This is particularly true of
7State v. Neal (Utah), 262 P.2d, 756.
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lay facts which can be recounted from memory as opposed
to expert observation or opinion, discernible by inference
and deduction.
It is frightening to conceive that on such inherently
improbable, inconsistent, incomplete, casual and uncorroborated testimony that the defendant should be sentenced
to prison for a minimum term of ten years.
C. The State Failed to Prove Essential Elements
of Its Case.
The State must prove, in order to sustain a conviction
for rape, the absence of consent on the part of the accusatory party. Stated more affirmatively, the State must
prove resistance overcome by force as an essential element
of the crime. See: 76-53-15 (3) U.C.A. 1953, Morris v.
State (Utah) 131 P. 731. Sexual intercourse, if consentual, is not rape. This is true even though such intercourse
may be accomplished by somewhat tumultuous means.
There is evidence in the record that the prosecutrix
was jesting with the defendant in an inviting manner
prior to their arrival in Blanding. 8 The prosecutrix' recital of the events surrounding the offense suggests, charitably, the absence of complete lucidity (R. 6, 7).
8

See the defendant's comment, "Well, this side of Devils Canyon
thei:e is a corral there and we went in there. I drove off there
and we, she was talking out, you know, kind of a strange girl.
I know she's always talkative and joking and always saying
something all funny all the time, but this was something else,
you know" (R. 75).
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The State did not contend that the defendant bore
evidences of resistance. The absence of such evidence
strongly contradicts the prosecutrix' statement that "she
fought with him with all her strength" (R. 6). As one
court succinctly stated,
It is hardly within the range of reason that a
man should come out of so desperate an encounter
. . . without signs thereof upon his face, hands or
clothing. Yet this prosecutrix, . . . mentions no
single act of resistance or reprisal. It is inconceivable that such efforts should have been forgotten
if they were made, or should fail of prominence in
her narrative." Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106

N.W. 536.

Aside from her general assertions that she fought the
defendant and resisted him physically, and attempted to
hide, the prosecutrix offered no specific examples of resistance. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin appropriately
stated in this regard,
"Further, it is settled in this state that no mere
general statements of the prosecutrix involving her
conclusions, that she did her utmost and the like,
will suffice to establish this essential fact, but she
must relate the very acts done, . . . " Brown v.
State, supra. (Emphasis supplied)
Without such proof, the State failed to establish resistance overcome by force, the "sine qua non" of the
crime of rape. There is no showing of such resistance as
the prosecutrix' age and strength, together with the at9
tending circumstances, might have led one to expect.
"The criteria as to what constitutes sufficient resistance are analyzed
in State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174.
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Summarizing the facts, without conceding that an
act of intercourse between the defendant and the prosecutrix ever occurred, it is apparent that the defendant was,
at the time of the alleged offense, intoxicated. 10 So were
the other occupants of the vehicle. The prosecutrix, who
claimed that she was in and out of consciousness, was, if
Jean Jones and the defendant are to be believed, also
drinking. The defendant, who like the prosecutrix was
"unsophisticated", may have legitimately interpreted the
absence of resistance to be the presence of consent. The
preliminary conduct of the prosecutrix, both prior to and
after the arrival at the Blanding City dump, was clearly
consistent with the notion of consent.
While outrage to the feelings of the victim is at the
heart of the crime of forcible rape, State v. McCune 16
Utah 170, 51 P. 818, it is also clear that the wilful intent
of the accused is a vital element. 76-1-20 U.C.A. 1953. If
an act of sexual intercourse actually occurred, and if the
prosecutrix did not expressly or impliedly consent, it
would not have been unreasonable, under the circumstances, for the defendant to have assumed that she did.
The defendant was not capable of drawing a suitable dis1 owhere intent is a necessary element of a particular crime, the
jury may consider the intoxication of the accused in determining the
"purpose, motive or intent" with which the act was committed. 76-1-22
U.C.A. 1953. To deprive the defendant of the full benefits of this provision is reversible error. State v. Dewey, 41 Utab 538, 127 P. 275, explained in State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 215, 207 P. 597. While the defendant did not request an instruction on the issue of his intoxication,
and while the coun did not deny such an instruction, the cumulative
effect of the instructions given was to treat the defendant as if he were
fully in control of all of his faculties. This created an erroneous impression which injured the defendant and constituted error. Without
some clarification of this critical point, the jury was insufficiently advised of the issues to be determined and misled to the prejudice of the
defendant.
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tinction between nonresistance based on consent, nonresistance based on a unique and unusual medical problem
(See Point I (B), this Brief) or nonresistance based on the
use of alcohol.
The defendant contends that reasonable minds could
not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix sufficiently resisted, or that the defendant wilfully intended to commit the crime of rape.
POINT II
THE COURT PERMITTED THE INTRODUCTION
OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND EXIIlBITS
WHICH MISLED THE JURY AND PREJUDICED
THE DEFENDANT.

The investigating officers made plaster casts of footprints found in the viciinity of the city dump in Blanding (R. 36). The identification of the plaster casts followed
testimony which indicated that the prints were found in
an area where there were "definite" signs that a "struggle"
had occurred (R. 35). After the preliminary identification
of the plaster casts, a shoe owned by the defendant was
marked for identification (R. 37). The casts were marked
as Exhibits 4 and 5 and the shoe was marked as Exhibit 6
(R. 3 7). The State then moved for the introduction of the
Exhibits (R. 40). At the time that the State moved for the
introduction of the Exhibits, there had been no evidence
presented which connected the shoe of the defendant to
the plaster casts, or the plaster casts to the defendant.
Further, there were "other prints" in the area which were
selectively omitted and not encasted (R. 33).
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The failure to connect the proposed Exhibits to the
defendant was called to the prosecutor's attention by the
Court (R. 40). The prosecutor then again submitted the
Exhibits, without connecting evidence, claiming that they
had "probative value" (R. 40). The Court then asked
whether a comparison had been made of the shoe and the
footprint and whether the testimony would establish that
the footprint was made by the shoe, to which the prosecutor answered, "No" (R. 40). The prosecutor then, in the
presence of the jury and without the benefit of the connecting testimony of the identifying witness, proceeded to
delineate in detail the factual basis for his claim that the
evidence was admissible. Having, by means of such testimony, suggested the pertinent answers to his witness, the
Chief of Police, the prosecutor then proceeded to attempt
to connect the two Exhibits through the witness and tie
them to the defendant (R. 41, 42). The witness then testified that the Exhibits were "similar" and "about" or "approximately" the same size, whereupon the Court received
the Exhibits in evidence (R. 42).
The rule of relevancy requires that evidence must
logically tend to establish the proposition which it is offered to prove. Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 154, 33 Ad. 998.
To say that a pair of men's shoes is "similar" to or "about"
the same size as a plaster cast made of a print selected from
among other prints at the scene of an alleged crime is singularly unhelpful. It does not render the inference for
which it is offered more probable than the other possible
inferences or hypotheses. If one starts with the proposition that nothing which is not logically relevant is ad20

missible,
then it must be conceded that Exhibits 4, 5
and 6, because they were of insufficient probative value to
sustain the proposition for which they were offered, were
not properly admitted. Their connection to the defendant was so slight, conjectural and remote as to require
their rejection.
11

Further, and more critically, assuming for the sake
of argument that the Exhibits had some probative value
or some logical relevance, it is clear that such criteria are,
where the connecting evidence is tenuous, more than
counterbalanced by other factors which call for their exclusion. Most prominent among these factors was the
danger that the evidence aroused the jury's emotions of
prejudice or hostility. Where evidence, though relevant,
excites prejudice which over-balances the assistance it
renders in advancing the inquiry, it should be excluded.
Rogers v. Rogers, 80 N.H. 96, 114 Ad. 270. See also, 31
C.J.S. 869, note 21.
While the defendant did not deny that his car was
parked on a dirt road west of Blanding (R. 78), the net
effect of the Exhibits, which were only remotely tied to
him, was to place him at the precise spot where the prosecutrix alleged the rape occurred and where the officer
stated that he had found "definite" signs of a "struggle".
This court has previously stated that,
"There are some criminal offenses that by
their inherent nature are so repulsive or even so
abhorrent to most people that the mere accusation,
nThayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 264-266 (1898).
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unless accompanied by every precaution of law,
creates a prejudice. Rape is among these." State v.
Whittinghill, 109 Utah 48, 163 P.2d 342. (Emphasis supplied).
It must be presumed that the admission of such evidence was prejudicial to the defendant. Further, the attempt to elicit connecting testimony from Officer Hawkins
was prejudicial to the defendant in light of the prosecutor's extensive personal attempt to bridge the factual gaps
in the testimony of the witness (R. 40, 41). The argument, made in the presence of the jury, anticipated and
suggested the later answers of the witness and was hence
improper. This court has stated that,
"Both the court and the prosecutor should be
zealous in protecting the rights of an accused, and
should carefully refrain from doing or saying anything from which it might be inferred that an unfair advantage was taken of a defendant." State v.
Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173.
It is important to note that the major part of the
officer's investigation (as well as the major part of his
testimony, R. 31 to 42), was devoted to preparing and
substantiating the various Exhibits. With the possible exception of the testimony of Dr. Gibbons, the little scientific method applied in this case reposed in Exhibits 4
and 5. To lay all the groundwork for the introduction in
evidence of such Exhibits without once connecting them to
the defendant, while clever, was unfair to the defendant.
Such unfairness had a substantial and prejudicial effect on
the jury. The jury is particularly impressionable where
the witness is, as in this case, the Chief of Police. This
22

court recognized the pervasive influence of such a witness
in a civil case in the following terms:
"It is only fair to assume that a jury would be
impressed by and give considerable weight to the
testimony of a patrolman with 24 years experience
in accident investigations. There is a reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of such testimony
the jury might have reached a different result."
Day v. Lorenzo Smith and Son Inc., 17 Utah 2d
221, 408 P. 2d 186. See also: Joseph v. W. H.
Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39,
318 P.2d 330.
Exhibit 1, a moccasin found at the scene of the alleged
crime, which presumably belonged to the prosecutrix, was
admitted in evidence though never identified by Larina
Yazzie or tied to her by the later testimony of Chief Hawkins. Further, the Chief did not connect the moccasins
to the "running" "female" footprints found among other
footprints near where he testified that physical indications were that a "struggle" had definitely occurred (R.
33, 35).
Defendant's counsel objected to the admission of the
Exhibits in general terms (R. 40, 41). Had he not so objected, or if the objection is now deemed to be somewhat
ambiguous, it is nevertheless clear that this court will, subject to necessary precautions, in "serious criminal cases"
under "special circumstances" where "the interests of
justice so require", notice palpable and significant error
even though proper objections were not taken at the
trial. State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174, See
also: State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952.
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POINT III
TIIE TRANSLATION WAS INACCURATE, CONFUSED AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT.

Throughout the trial, there were examples on the
record of the difficulty of translation. The critical testimony of Larina Yazzie, Jean Jones and Evelyn Williams
was heard through an interpreter. One of the kinds of
problems encountered by the defendant was evidenced by
the repartee between counsel, the court and the interpreter
which is reflected on page 62 of the record and which involved the cross-examination of Jean Jones, a witness for
the defense. The exchange is as follows:

"Q

Now, Mrs. Jones, did Benton Keith ask you
to come here today?
A. They came over to my place and I came with
them.

Q.
A.

Who talked to her about coming here to tell
her story today?
Well, they asked me to come and it was
Benton.

Q.

That is, Benton Keith asked her to come?
Yes.

Q.

Did he ask you what you were going to say
here today and talk to you about it?
Yes.

A.

A.

MR. HALLIDAY:
MR. BUNNELL:

What did she say again?
She said yes.

MR. HALLIDAY: My client indicates it was the
wrong translation. I don't know, your Honor, I have to go by what he says. (Emphasis
supplied).
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THE COURT: Well, we can't argue with the interpreter I don't suppose, is there any misunderstanding about the last question or
answer?
INTERPRETER: That's just translated what he
said and she may have misunderstood what
I said. But that's the, I just put it the way it
was asked."
Repeated inaccuracies in the translation of the testimony substantively affected the proceedings below. The
cumulative effect of the errors reflected on the record in
the testimony of Larina Yazzie, Jean Jones and Evelyn
Williams was to distort the accuracy of the facts. Such
distortions operated to the prejudice of the defendant and
materially affected his substantial rights. An Appendix of
some of the most obvious errors is included at the back of
this Brief (Brief, 31).
There is some indication on the record that the interpreter, George Lameman, was either a material witness
to certain facts, a relative of material witnesses, or identifiable as a friend of the prosecutrix. Note the following
testimony of Dr. Gibbons in that regard:
MR. BUNNELL: "Q. When you arrived there
[i.e. Larina Yazzie's home] about 7 a.m. who
was there at the house besides Larina?
DR. GIBBONS: A. I believe Gordon Hawkins
was there. And I am not sure whether it
was - Willy I think.
MR. BUNNELL:
Navajo?
DR. GIBBONS:

Q.
A.
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Would that be another
Yes.

MR. BUNNELL:

Q.

That you refer to?

A. Yes, I am not sure whether
it was him or Mr. and Mrs. l.Ameman. I

DR. GIBBONS:

think it was Willy though (R. 23)." (Emphasis supplied)

In any event, however the interpreter was privately
characterized, the net effect of the translation was to confuse and distort the facts, depriving the defendant of a fair
trial. It is the responsibility of the interpreter to be "absolutely impersonal putting the questions of counsel with

no added remarks of his own and giving back the witness'
answer in the witness' own words." Prokop v. Nebraska,
148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W.2d 200, (Emphasis supplied). See
also: 172 A.L.R. 91. On numerous occasions the interpreter in the instant case made observable errors (See:
Appendix) or recited the answers of the prosecutrix and of
other witnesses in the third person. Because the prosecutrix testimony was not verbatim as spoken, but colored
and interpreted in the translation, the defendant was deprived of his right to a clear and impartial presentation of
the evidence. The proper rule with respect to interpretation is that the testimony should be repeated by the translator literally and in the first person. Gregory v. Chicago,
R.D. and P.R. Co., 147 Iowa 715, 124 N.W. 797.
This court has many times indicated that the facts
on appeal are to be considered in a light favorable to the
respondent and that it will not lightly interfere with the
fact finding function of the jury. l.Arson v. Evans, 12 Utah
2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088, Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.,
1 Utah 2d 243, 263 P.2d 287.
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It is, however, apparent, that the reasons why this
court should not interpose itself into the fact finding
process, are far less compelling where translation difficulties have deprived the jury of those certain innate advantages which it conceptually enjoys. The value of so
12
called "list" evidence is substantially minimized where
the jury cannot understand the witness' testimony or inflections and where it must take the analysis second-hand
through an interpreter. This is doubly true where, as
here, the quality and impartiality of the translation are
open to serious question.
The failure of trial counsel to clearly formulate his
objections to the translator's interpretation of the testimony should not defeat his right to claim error on appeal
under the principles enunciated in State v. Sanchez, supra,
and State v. Cobo, supra.

POINT IV
THAT THE ERRORS OF THE COURT WERE
CUMULATIVE AND WHEN VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH EACH OTHER RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT.
It is a fundamental rule that even though the errors
of the court, if they were considered to be separate and
isolated instances, may not amount to the deprivation of
a fair trial, if the various errors combine to reach that result, prejudice to the defendant may be shown. State v.
1"Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77,
80 (2nd Cir.).
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Moore 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973. This is especially
true of the crime of rape. It is mandatory that this court
superintend the trial process by requiring that every "precaution of law" be required in a case of this kind. State
v.Whittinghill, supra.
It is submitted that the errors enumerated were such
as to cumulatively prejudice the defendant and that they
did in fact deprive him of a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
The conviction of the defendant, who is married and
the father of three children (R. 102), was accomplished
on flimsy evidence. The testimony of the prosecutrix,
upon whom the State principally relied was not clear and
convincing. See: Morris v. State, (Utah) 131 P. 731. Careful analysis of the critical facts demonstrates, for instance,
that the prosecutrix testified that during the course of the
alleged offense she became unconscious six times. On each
of the two occasions involving separate offenses she testified, most propitiously, that she awakened to find the defendant engaged in acts of sexual intercourse. On each
occasion, again most propitiously, she awakened to observe the defendant putting on his clothes. Such incredible and unlikely observations must, as this court has
previously observed, raise a strong presumption that her
testimony is false and feigned. State v. Halford, 17 Utah
475, 54 P. 819. Further, given the contradicting testimony of the prosecutrix' companion and tribal "mother",
Jean Jones, and the abnormal findings of her personal
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physician, Dr. Gibbons, it was incumbent upon the State
to present adequate corroborating evidence to substantiate her claims.
While one must view the evidence on appeal in a
light favorable to the prosecutrix, it is apparent that Larina Yazzie spent nearly nine hours with the defendant
during the evening and early morning of September 22
and 23, 1969. Approximately eight of these hours were
spent near the city dump in Blanding. She furnished the
money which was used to purchase alcohol. She accompanied others, all of whom were drinking, on a lengthy
round of activities without making any objection. She
drove past her home in the city of Blanding and went directly to the city dump without complaint. She remained
in the automobile with the defendant when all of its other
occupants, including two women companions, departed.
She made no outcry when the offense allegedly occurred
although the other occupants of the vehicle were in the
immediate area and presumably within the sound of her
voice. When purportedly trying to escape she ran in a
direction other than the one taken by her companions.
She engaged in no specific acts of resistance or reprisal and
the defendant bore no marks from the alleged encounter.
She waited five hours to notify the police. She had been
in the presence of Sam Chee less than two hours before
asking the defendant, her own nephew, for a ride home.
It is submitted that the Court permitted the introduction of inadmissible evidence and exhibits and that the
effect of the State's testimony, when taken in context, was
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to unfairly deprive the defendant of a fair, "full" and impartial trial. The verdict of the jury was influenced by the
translation which, because it was on many occasions in
third person and inaccurate, confused and distorted the
evidence and permitted its improper interpretation. The
jury was not presented with evidence which was sufficient
to satisfy reasonable minds beyond a reasonable doubt
that the crime of rape occurred.
The defendant, with the consent of the Court and of
the County Attorney for San Juan County, has been free
on his own recognizance since the trial, a period exceeding
seventeen months (R. 104). He is no threat to society and
should be released.
The matter should be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,
JOEL M. ALLRED
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX
Substantial parts of the testimony were in third person. Despite the admonition of the Court (R. 11) there
were repeated instances of third person translation. In
this regard see R. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20, 57,
61, 62 and 70.
There were numerous errors in the translation which,
in some instances, made the record almost unintelligible.
Examples:
Q. "Who else was in the car?
A. In the car were Mrs. Jones. Scotty Jones, the
widow of Scotty Jones. Billy Jones and the
brother-in-law to Benton and Benton was also
in the car." (R. 4) 13
Q. "What happened at the city dump?
A. When they stopped at the city dump then
"
two women got, were sitting by her .
(R. 5).
Q. "Is Scotty Jones wife, is that Jean Jones?
A. Yes. He was in back of the pickup when he
came to Monticello." (R. 12)
On several occasions the translator was simply confused.
Q. "You, well lets see. Will you tell the jury
how you got over to Monticello from Blanding?
A. Let me get it straight now. I can't tell what
she's saying. . . " (R. 12).
For further examples of the translation problems
check R. 5, 9, 62-63, 65.
1 3Note that Betty Jones Phillips not "Billy Jones" was the passen·
ger (R. 73). Later Betty Jones Phillips was referred to as "Buddy Jones"
(R. 5).
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